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Being the backbone routing system of the Internet, the operational aspect of the inter-domain routing is
highly complex. Building a trustworthy ecosystem for inter-domain routing requires the proper
maintenance of trust relationships among tens of thousands of peer IP domains called Autonomous
Systems (ASes). ASes today implicitly trust any routing information received from other ASes as part of
the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) updates. Such blind trust is problematic given the dramatic rise in the
number of anomalous updates being disseminated, which pose grave security consequences for the
inter-domain routing operation. In this paper, we present ASCRED, an AS reputation and alert service that
not only detects anomalous BGP updates, but also provides a quantitative view of AS’ tendencies to
perpetrate anomalous behavior.
AS-CRED focuses on detecting two types of anomalous updates (1)hijacked: updates where ASes
announcing a prefix that they do not own; and (2) vacillating: updates that are part of a quick succession
of announcements and withdrawals involving a specific prefix, rendering the information practically
ineffective for routing. AS-CRED works by analyzing the past updates announced by ASes for the
presence of these anomalies. Based on this analysis, it generates AS reputation values that provide an
aggregate and quantitative view of the AS’ anomalous behavior history. The reputation values are then
used in a tiered alert system for tracking any subsequent anomalous updates observed. Analyzing ASCRED’s operation with real-world BGP traffic over six months, we demonstrate the effectiveness and
improvement of the proposed approach over similar alert systems.
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Abstract—Being the backbone routing system of the Internet,
the operational aspect of the inter-domain routing is highly
complex. Building a trustworthy ecosystem for inter-domain
routing requires the proper maintenance of trust relationships
among tens of thousands of peer IP domains called Autonomous
Systems (ASes). ASes today implicitly trust any routing information received from other ASes as part of the Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) updates. Such blind trust is problematic given
the dramatic rise in the number of anomalous updates being
disseminated, which pose grave security consequences for the
inter-domain routing operation. In this paper, we present ASCRED, an AS reputation and alert service that not only detects
anomalous BGP updates, but also provides a quantitative view
of AS’ tendencies to perpetrate anomalous behavior.
AS-CRED focuses on detecting two types of anomalous updates
(1) hijacked: updates where ASes announcing a prefix that they
do not own; and (2) vacillating: updates that are part of a
quick succession of announcements and withdrawals involving a
specific prefix, rendering the information practically ineffective
for routing. AS-CRED works by analyzing the past updates
announced by ASes for the presence of these anomalies. Based on
this analysis, it generates AS reputation values that provide an
aggregate and quantitative view of the AS’ anomalous behavior
history. The reputation values are then used in a tiered alert
system for tracking any subsequent anomalous updates observed.
Analyzing AS-CRED’s operation with real-world BGP traffic
over six months, we demonstrate the effectiveness and improvement of the proposed approach over similar alert systems.
Index Terms—Border Gateway Protocol, autonomous systems,
reputation, alert service

I. I NTRODUCTION
In the realm of inter-domain routing, large IP domains,
called Autonomous Systems (ASes), use the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) for exchanging reachability information
among themselves. Being the backbone routing system of the
Internet, the operational aspect of the inter-domain routing is
highly complex. It involves the coordination and cooperation
of tens of thousands of ASes and millions of routing devices,
structured in a fully decentralized and distributed fashion,
where each participant AS enforces its own routing policies
to achieve various business and traffic engineering goals.
The current design of BGP implicitly assumes complete
trust between ASes. This blind trust assumption is problematic
as it has been the key vulnerability for a growing number
K.K. Venkatasubramanian is currently with the Department of Computer Science, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA. Email: kven@cs.wpi.edu. J. Chang is currently with OpenX, Pasadena,
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This research was supported in part by ONR MURI N00014-07-1-0907.
POC: Insup Lee, lee@cis.upenn.edu

of attacks on the Internet’s operation [1]. These attacks are
usually carried out by ASes that announce anomalous BGP
updates containing invalid reachability information (e.g., hijacked IP prefixes). These attacks fundamentally affect the
accessibility of the Internet and can have grave consequences
to attacks akin to DNS poisoning [2] and phishing [3]. The
reasons for these incidents have usually been found to be either
malice such as spamming [4] or misconfiguration [5], [6],
[7]. There are three major challenges in securing the inter
domain routing from these attacks: (1) lack of ground trust:
there is no authoritative source of information to determine
the validity of BGP updates; (2) dynamic and mixed AS
behavior: ASes announce both valid and anomalous updates
(often simultaneously, but for different prefixes); and (3) scale
of the Internet: it is often very expensive (in terms of time and
resources) to deploy a security mechanism covering the entire
inter-domain routing system.
Two approaches have traditionally been taken for securing
inter-domain routing: prevention and detection. The former
requires the use of cryptographic mechanisms and attempts to
overcome the first challenge by “building the ground truth”,
so that only the announcements of the prefixes that an AS
can reach directly (i.e., own1 ) would be accepted by its peer
ASes. The most famous example of such preventive schemes
is S-BGP [8]. However, these approaches often impose a too
high deployment and operation cost to be useful [9], [10],
thus failing to address the third challenge. Consequently, the
principal aim of recent research has been to detect instances
of anomalous updates at the control-plane [11], [12], [13]
or the data-plane [14], [15], [16] of BGP. These detection
approaches propose various heuristics to determine the update
validity. However, they do not provide sufficient evidence that
the proposed heuristics are robust to the evolving and mixed
nature of AS behaviors, thus failing to address the second
challenge. Further, some of the detection mechanisms also fail
to address the third challenge as they need to be deployed at
specific locations (e.g., being the victim of the attacks) to be
effective [16].
In this paper we take a different approach. Based on realworld BGP traffic, we observe that ASes that announced an
anomalous update in the past are very likely to repeat such
behavior in the near future. We therefore focus on developing
an AS reputation and alert service that not only detects
anomalous BGP updates, but also provides a quantitative view
of the tendencies of ASes to perpetrate anomalous behavior.
1 We use the term own to describe prefixes: (1) allocated to ASes by a
Regional Internet Registry (RIR) such as ARIN, RIPE and APNIC; or (2)
belonging to the customers of Autonomous Systems whose prefixes the ASes
are aggregating.
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This service, called AS-CRED, is inspired by the notion of
credit score, which has been used as an effective approach for
solving trust problems in the complex world of finance that
involves billions of entities and highly uncertain interactions.
AS-CRED works by analyzing the past update announcements
of all observed ASes in the Internet for the presence of two
types of anomalous updates: (1) hijacked updates where ASes
announcing a prefix that they do not own; and (2) vacillating
updates that are part of a quick succession of announcements and withdrawals involving a specific prefix, rendering
the information practically ineffective for routing. Inspired
by previous works [7], [12], [17], the analysis of historical
updates is done based on the sustenance of prefix ownership.
Out of this stability analysis, AS-CRED generates feedback
on the ASes, which is then fed into a reputation function to
compute AS reputation. Since the reputation is computed based
on trustworthy local feedback, AS-CRED is not vulnerable to
biased/incorrect feedback deliberately providing by colluding
ASes. Additionally, based on the analysis of the historical BGP
data, AS-CRED also creates a “white-list”: a list of AS-prefix
pairs where the prefix is stably owned by the respective AS for
long periods of time, proving the legitimacy of the ownership.
The reputation and the “white-list” are then used to design a
novel tiered alert system, as follows: (1) AS reputation is used
as a behavior-predictive metric for generating hijacked or vacillating alerts for updates from ASes that have poor reputation
(i.e., announced large number of anomalous updates). (2) The
“white-list” is then used to filter out (bound the inaccuracy
of the alert generation process) updates with AS-prefix pairs
that are considered deemed legitimate. (3) To compensate for
sudden behavior pattern changes of reputable ASes, a special
alert type, Potentially Invalid, is triggered.
The analysis of past BGP data allows AS-CRED to correctly
classify historical AS behavior. The idea here is that although
there is no complete and accurate ground truth available to
determine the validity of BGP updates in real-time, such a
task can be effectively performed with the benefit of hindsight,
thus addressing the first challenge. To address the second
challenge, the reputation function incorporates the notion of
time-decay to adapt to the evolution of AS behavior patterns.
Moreover, the reputation function is designed to solely consider anomalous AS behavior, thus preventing a misbehaved
AS from inflating its reputation by announcing large number of
regular updates. As BGP operates by exchanging reachability
information about all the active ASes and prefixes in the Internet, local information obtained from a set of well-connected
BGP nodes can be used to compute reputation values for the
observable portion of the Internet at the inter-domain level,
thus addressing the third challenge.
Our implementation of AS-CRED is based on live BGP
trace from the RouteViews project with its operation results
publicly available2 . The public availability of the AS reputation and alerts not only incentivizes good behavior from
ASes, but also provides an effective diagnostic and forensic
tool to debug network connectivity issues at Internet scale.
AS-CRED currently is a centralized system, but can easily be
implemented by individual ASes in a distributed manner for
obtaining their local views of peer ASes reputation and trigger2 http://rtg.cis.upenn.edu/qtm/ascred/
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ing customized alerts. The contributions of the paper are: (1)
prefix ownership stability heuristics for detecting anomalous
BGP updates; (2) an adaptive AS reputation scheme; and (3)
a tiered reputation-based alert service that accurately tracks
anomalous updates. The analysis of AS-CRED over a six
month period indicates its effectiveness and improvement of
over similar alert systems.
The paper is organized as follows; Section II presents the
background, the anomaly model, the problem statement, and
an overview of our approach. Section III presents details of
AS-CRED architecture, the feedback and reputation model,
and the data source. Section IV and V present the historical
AS anomaly detection and the alert generation service of
AS-CRED, respectively. Section VI presents mechanisms for
tuning the various parameters of AS-CRED. Sections VII and
VIII present the security and performance analysis results
of AS-CRED. Section IX presents the related work. Finally,
Section X concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Border Gateway Protocol
The Border Gateway Protocol is a path-vector routing
protocol for exchanging information about reaching IP address
prefixes [18]. Using BGP, an AS x, which owns a prefix p,
announces an update notifying its neighboring AS y of its
ownership. The AS x is called the announcer or announcing
AS. AS y then forwards this update further to its neighbor
AS z by adding its own AS number to the path vector, called
AS PATH, in the update. This informs AS z that in order to
reach the prefix p, the gateway router at AS y is the next hop.
When an update is received at an AS, it determines whether
the update should be accepted or not. The acceptance of an
update implies that the router is willing to add the route to the
prefix into its routing information base. Each AS has its own
policies that determine whether it accepts a BGP update and
whether the update can be forwarded to its neighbors. Routing
policies serve an important purpose in BGP and provide an AS
with not only the capability to prefer one route over another,
but also to filter or tag an update to change the route’s relative
preference downstream.
B. Anomaly Model
In this section, we summarize the different types of anomalous updates that AS-CRED detects. Critical to understanding
these anomalies is the notion of AS-prefix binding. We define
the term AS-prefix binding {a, p} as a claimed ownership of
a particular prefix p by AS a. It is established when AS a
announces prefix p for the first time through a BGP update.
An AS-prefix binding may have many instances, which refer to
an announcement and corresponding withdrawal of prefix p by
AS a. AS-CRED considers two types of anomalous updates:
• Hijacked Updates: these updates establish AS-prefix
bindings with prefixes not belonging to the AS making
the announcement [12]. Table I shows a list of wellknown hijacked prefix announcements in the past. Hijacking is a persistent threat within the inter-domain world
and has been triggered as a result of misconfiguration [5]
or for malicious purposes such as spamming [4].
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TABLE I
AS- PREFIX B INDING S TABILITY FOR D OCUMENTED P REFIX H IJACKING I NSTANCES
Date
Dec. 2004 - Jan. 2005
Dec. 2004 - Jan. 2005
Jan. 13, 2007
Feb. 24, 2008
Mar. 15, 2008
Apr. 8, 2010

Prefix Hijacked
61.0.0.0/8
82.0.0.0/8
12.0.0.0/8
208.65.153.0/24
194.9.82.0/24
29867 Prefixes

Victim AS
Various
Various
7018
36561 (YouTube)
36915
Various

Attacker AS
4787
8717
31604
17557
6461
23724

TABLE II
E XAMPLES OF VACILLATING AS- PREFIX B INDINGS (NAW: N UMBER OF
A NNOUNCEMENTS AND W ITHDRAWALS )
AS
Prefix
NAW
Duration Observed
145
140.217.157.0/24
1080
Nov. 1 - Nov. 27, 2009
8452
41.235.83.0./24
2088
Nov. 2 - Nov. 10, 2009
8452
41.235.87.0./24
1602
Nov. 2 - Nov. 10, 2009
704
152.63.49.180/30
1628
Dec. 8 - Dec. 31, 2009
2905
41.210.184.0/24
1774
Dec. 23, 2009 - Jan. 06, 2010

Vacillating Updates: these updates establish AS-prefix
bindings with a large number of short-lived instances.
Such AS-prefix bindings are the result of a quick succession of announcements and withdrawal of prefixes by
ASes, rendering the information practically ineffective for
routing. For instance, AS37035 was seen announcing and
withdrawing the prefix 41.222.179.0/24, which it owns,
4824 times between Dec. 3, 2009 and Dec. 7, 2009
(more examples are shown in Table II). This amounts to
announcing and withdrawing the prefix repeatedly, once
every 1.5 minutes on average. Vacillating prefixes are an
important cause of route-flapping, a behavior which can
lead to the propagation of excessive number of updates
depleting BGP router resources.
The bindings established by these anomalous updates are
called hijacked AS-prefix bindings and vacillating AS-prefix
bindings, respectively. AS-prefix bindings established due to
such anomalous updates are collectively called invalid ASprefix bindings. Any binding not deemed invalid is considered
valid. Note that in this paper we do not consider AS PATH
related anomalies (e.g., path spoofing, or violation of valleyfree routing). Further, in this paper we operate at the abstraction of AS-prefix bindings and not prefixes or ASes alone.
Therefore, a multi-homed prefix p announced by both AS
x and AS y, will result in two separate AS-prefix bindings
{x, p} and {y, p}. Similarly, a prefix p and its sub-prefix p0
announced by AS f and AS g respectively, will be treated
as two separate AS-prefix bindings {f, p} and {g, p0 }. This
allows us to not explicitly distinguish between the cases of
prefixes and sub-prefixes when discussing the validity of the
AS-prefix bindings. In the rest of the paper, we use the terms
AS-prefix binding, prefix binding and binding, interchangeably.

# of Instances
100+
100+
1
1
1
30K+

Data Collection

Historical Anomaly Detector
AS-prefix
Bindings

BGP Activity
Manager

Stability Analysis

G Feedback Set (White-list)

BGP
BGP
BGP
Update
Update
Updates

•

C. Problem Statement and Approach
The principal questions that we want address in this paper
are: (1) how to characterize the tendency of an AS announcing
anomalous BGP updates? and (2) how to use this AS behavior
to generate alerts for any subsequent anomalous updates?
Fundamentally, the answer to the above questions requires
effective trust quantifications of AS behavior. In this regard,
we take a reputation-based approach. The reputation of an
entity (an AS, in this context) is a characterization of its past

Duration
< 1 minute
< 1 minute
4 hours 26 minutes
9 hours 45 minutes
17 minutes
∼8 hours

Alert Manager
SVM Classifier

B & U Feedback Set

Reputation Manager

AS Reputation

Reputation Portal
Real-time Alerts

AS Reputation & Real-time Alert

BGP Trace Collector

Fig. 1.

End Users

AS-CRED Architecture
TABLE III
S UMMARY OF U SED ACRONYMS

Acronym
ASes
BGP
GBU Set
Pr (Ps)
TPr (TPs)
VBL
VT (HJ) set
IRR
IAR

Description
Autonomous Systems
Border Gateway Protocol
The three feedback sets for AS behavior
Prevalence (Persistence) of AS-prefix bindings
Prevalence (Persistence) threshold for stability analysis of AS behavior
Valid Binding List
Set of AS-prefix bindings with Hijacked (Vacillating)
alert label
Internet Routing Registeries
Internet Alert Registry

performance relative to a specific set of behaviors. For entities
that are consistent in their behavioral patterns, reputation
forms an effective and predictive model. Using reputation,
one can trust/distrust entities based on the degree to which
they exhibit specific behaviors. The key for successfully using
reputation systems is to ensure that gaining high reputation
requires a considerable amount of resources and time devoted
by an entity. In other words, reputation systems exploit the
limitations of the adversary by trading-off resources and time
for security.
Reputation systems work by (1) identifying behaviors of
interest, (2) monitoring for exhibition of the behaviors, and
(3) providing feedback on the experience. Once the feedback
being received, the reputation can be computed based on a
mathematical function. In this work, the behavior in question
is the announcement of anomalous updates that contain invalid
AS-prefix bindings. Our approach is a three-step process:
(1) Historical Anomaly Detection: Evaluate the past updates
announced by ASes for establishing hijacked or vacillating
bindings, (2) Reputation Computation: compute AS reputation
based on the identified anomalous behavior, (3) Alert Generation: use the reputation to trigger alerts for any invalid bindings
in subsequent updates. Table III summarizes the principal
acronyms used in the rest of the paper.
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Observation Window (60 days)
Nov. 01,
2009

Dec. 03,
2010

Dec. 30, Jan. 01,
2009
2010

Alert Generation Windows (1day, in total 6 months)
Jan. 31,
2010

Consistency Verification Window (60 days)

Fig. 2.
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Jun. 01,
2010

Jun. 30,
2010

Jul. 30,
2010

Consistency Verification Window (60 days)

Data Source Time Windows

III. AS-CRED: R EPUTATION AND A LERT S ERVICE FOR
I NTER - DOMAIN ROUTING
In this paper, we present AS-CRED, an AS reputation and
alert service for inter-domain routing. We begin by describing
the architecture of AS-CRED, the feedback and reputation
mechanism that forms the core of AS-CRED, and the data
source that it uses for reputation computation and later for
analysis.
A. AS-CRED Architecture
The AS-CRED service is designed to be a portal for
disseminating information about ASes and their anomalous
updates announcements. AS-CRED has five main components
(see Figure 1):
• BGP Activity Manager: This is a database that collects
BGP updates from well-connected BGP trace collectors
(e.g., RouteViews [19]). The data provides a view of
active ASes in the Internet and the prefixes that they
announce at different times.
• Historical Anomaly Detector: This component analyzes
the updates in the BGP Activity Manager, received within
a specific time duration called the observation window,
for the presence of anomalies. The output is a “whitelist” of valid AS-prefix bindings and a classification of
the past updates announced by ASes. The latter forms the
feedback for the Reputation Manager.
• Reputation Manager: This computes the reputation of the
ASes based on the feedback provided by the Historical
Anomaly Detector.
• Reputation Portal: The reputation computed for the ASes
is made available through a web portal.
• Alert Manager: Combining the “white-list” with the
reputation values, it triggers real-time alerts.
Note that, AS-CRED dynamically manages the reputation
of ASes as their behavior changes over time. In this regard,
the Historical Anomaly Detector continuously evaluates the
updates received over a sliding window, which includes newer
updates and excludes older ones, and provides updated feedback to the Reputation Manager.
B. Feedback and Reputation Computation
AS reputation is computed based on the feedback provided
by the Historical Anomaly Detector. In this section, we describe the types of feedback that the analysis of historical
updates from ASes provides and the reputation function used
by the Reputation Manager.
1) Feedback: In AS-CRED, feedback is a triple of the form
{a, p, t}, where a is the AS announcing the prefix p at timestamp t. Each feedback triple is exclusively classified into one
of the three feedback sets, namely, G (good), B (bad), and U
(ugly): (i) A feedback gi = {a, p, t} in the G set is provided

each time an AS announces a valid AS-prefix binding. The AS
and prefix involved are said to be exhibiting good behavior.
(ii) A feedback bi = {a, p, t} in the B set is provided each time
an AS’s behavior is not good but does not subvert the intended
BGP operation; and (iii) A feedback ui = {a, p, t} in the U
set is provided each time an AS does not demonstrate good
behavior and subverts the intended BGP operation. We use the
term GBU sets to refer to the three feedback sets, collectively.
The act of announcing AS-prefix bindings that populate the B
or the U set is called poor behavior. The GBU sets form the
feedback that is provided for AS reputation computation. Note
that, an AS may demonstrate good behavior for one prefix but
simultaneously demonstrate poor behavior for others. Section
IV describes how these feedback sets are populated. Finally, as
the feedback is generated locally, we do not have to consider
the case of potentially dishonest external feedback affecting
our reputation computation outcome.
2) AS Reputation Function: The reputation assigned to
ASes by the Reputation Manager is a measure of: (1) how
many invalid AS-prefix bindings they establish, and (2) how
often they establish such invalid bindings. Computing reputation in this manner allows AS-CRED to protect itself from
ASes mounting self-promotion attacks as we shall see in
Section VII. Further, valid AS-prefix bindings far outnumber
the invalid ones, making the measurement of invalidity far
more useful.
The reputation of an AS is computed based on the feedback
in the B and the U sets. The values do not have absolute
meaning and must be interpreted in a relative manner. The
reputation in AS-CRED is calculated using the following
function:
X
RepX (a) =
2−(tnow −t)/hX
(1)
t

Here, RepX (a) is the reputation of an AS a for exhibiting poor
behavior type X, X ∈ {B, U }. tnow is the current time and t
is the time-stamp of when X was observed. hX is the half-life
of the decay function for exhibiting the behavior X. The values
of tnow − t are in the same units as hX . It can be seen that
the reputation returned for an AS varies between 0 (the best
possible reputation) and Ω (the worst possible reputation3 ).
Section VIII-A2 describes how we assign the half-life value
for computing the reputation.
In AS-CRED, reputation of an AS a is thus a vector of the
form [RepB (a), RepU (a)], where RepB (a) is the reputation
of an AS a based on each of its entries in the B set. Similarly,
RepU (a) is the reputation of an AS a based on each of its
entries in the U set. The reputation value changes depending
upon the addition of associated feedbacks into the B or the U
set. Therefore, the reputation essentially quantifies the extent
3 The absolute worst AS is the one that has an entry in the B or the U set
for every possible time-stamp in the observation window and at each timestamp it has committed a poor behavior for all possible prefixes in the IP
address space.
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of invalid bindings announced by ASes. AS-CRED reputation
has three properties: (1) the initial reputation of ASes is set
to the best possible value [0,0] (see Section VI-2 for more
details on this choice); (2) the reputation value is updated
as incidences of poor behaviors are observed; and (3) more
recently observed poor behaviors are weighed more heavily
than older ones, as it has been observed that a recent poor
behavior is usually a precursor to another one.
C. Data Source and System Setup
We use the RouteViews BGP trace collector [19], maintained by University of Oregon, to populate the BGP Activity
Manager. At the time of writing, RouteViews directly received
BGP updates from 46 ASes. It has been shown in [20] that
RouteViews covers almost all the ASes currently active within
the Internet and is therefore a good source for computing
reputation of ASes. Consequences of using a different trace
collector in the operation of AS-CRED will be discussed in
Section VIII-A4. For the purposes of this work, we assume the
RouteViews repository is trustworthy and provides accurate
information.
In this work we present reputation and analysis results using
six months worth of BGP data. The first step in this regard
is to determine the length of the sliding window also known
as observation window. The length of the observation window
is a function of the reputation function used, and needs to
be chosen with some care. It should be sufficiently long to
prevent the reputation values from being biased by transient
phenomena such as failures, network outages, BGP update
fluctuation, and route-flaps. However, keeping it too long is
unnecessary as the reputation value is minimally affected by
poor behaviors displayed beyond a certain time in the past.
In this work, the chosen value is 60 days. A change in the
reputation function used may require a re-calibration of the
observation window length. Further details on choosing this
value will be discussed in Section VI-1.
Our experiments began with the BGP data from Nov. 1,
2009 - Dec. 30, 2009 (see Figure 2). This 60 day period is the
initial observation window. AS behavior during this period
is used to compute the reputation of the ASes on Jan. 1,
2010, leaving a 24-hour grace-period on Dec. 31, 2009. These
reputations are then used to generate alerts for the updates
received on Jan. 1, 2010. The observation window is then
slid forward by one day (Nov. 2, 2009 to Dec. 31 2009)
to recompute AS reputations in order to generate alerts for
Jan. 2, 2010, and so on. In this manner, we have analyzed
behavior, computed reputation and generated alerts on every
day from Jan. 1, 2010 to Jun. 30, 2010. Each day alerts are
generated is termed as alert generation window. We find that
recomputing reputations once a day is computationally feasible
and provides sufficient predictive power.
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TABLE IV
P REVALENCE , P ERSISTENCE AND F EEDBACK

Prevalence
high
high
low
low

Persistence
high
low
high
low

Feedback
G
B (Vacillating)
G
U (Hijacked)

stable in nature. On the other hand, shorter binding duration
implies greater chances of the binding being invalid [12],
[21]. Inspired by this results, we first present two heuristics to
compute the level of stability of AS-prefix bindings and can
therefore can be used to deduce their validity.
A. Prevalence and Persistence
Prevalence (Pr) of an AS-prefix binding is the percentage
of time a prefix is claimed to be directly reachable by an AS
within a time window (the observation window, in our case).
More formally:
P r(a, p) =

N
X
(T wi (a, p) − T oi (a, p))/Tobsv

(2)

i

Here, N is the number of times the prefix p is claimed to
be owned by the AS a within the observation window, i
is the index of all the announcements of prefix p by AS
a during Tobsv (the observation window). T w(a, p) is the
time prefix p is withdrawn by AS a. T o(a, p) is the time
prefix p is the announced by AS a. If the prevalence is above
a threshold then the binding is considered stable. However,
the prevalence metric alone is not sufficient, as it will not
be able to detect repeated short-duration binding instances.
We therefore consider another metric in conjunction with
prevalence, called persistence. Persistence (Ps) of an AS-prefix
binding is defined as the average duration of a binding instance
in the observation window. More formally:
P s(a, p) =

N
X
(T wi (a, p) − T oi (a, p))/N

(3)

i

The symbols have the same meaning as stated earlier. Given
the definition of the two heuristics, it is easy to see that relationship between persistence and prevalence for an AS-prefix
binding always follows the relation: P s(a, p) ≤ P r(a, p) ×
Tobsv ≤ Tobsv . It is important to note that both prevalence and
persistence are applied to AS-prefix bindings received over the
observation window. The observation window extends wellbeyond the day when the AS-prefix binding was first seen.
This gives the historical anomaly detection process the ability
to observe how an AS-prefix binding evolves after it was first
observed.
B. Feedback

IV. H ISTORICAL A NOMALY D ETECTION
Computing reputation for ASes requires feedback on their
historical prefix announcements. In this section, we present
the stability property used by the Historical Anomaly Detector
component to generate feedback for reputation computation.
In the inter-domain routing world, it has been shown that
valid AS-prefix bindings last for long durations and are very

In order to map our observations of AS-prefix binding
stability into a reputation, we have to classify them into
the GBU sets. Table IV shows the classification based on
the prevalence and persistence being above or below two
thresholds, T P r for prevalence and T P s for persistence.
These two thresholds are static in AS-CRED and have been
set to T P r = 1% and T P s = 10 hours for prevalence and
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persistence, respectively. Section VI-3 provides more details
on the approach for choosing the values. A value below the
threshold is called low and one above is called high. We
now discuss the types of feedback given to ASes for different
prevalence and persistence values.
a) Case 1: High Prevalence and High Persistence:
If an AS-prefix binding exhibits high prevalence and high
persistence, it is stable and classified into the G set. This G
set forms the “white-list” called the Valid Binding List (VBL),
containing the latest set of valid AS-prefix bindings. Such a
list is not a new notion in the domain of BGP. Approaches
for detecting prefix hijacking such as PGBGP [12] and PHAS
[13] also create list of AS-prefix bindings they consider valid.
However, the lists are of poorer quality because PGBGP only
considers persistence of AS-prefix bindings but not prevalence,
while PHAS simply chooses a cut-off time and assumes all the
AS-prefix bindings before this time to be valid. AS-CRED, on
the other hand, computes average persistence and prevalence
of AS-prefix bindings over a sliding window, which results in
a more adaptive and accurate list.
b) Case 2: Low Prevalence and High Persistence: If the
prevalence is low and persistence is high, it means that the
particular AS-prefix binding did not recur many times, and
while it lasted it did so for a reasonable amount of time. This
is consistent with valid temporary bindings (e.g., backup AS
taking over while the main AS serving the prefixes is down
for maintenance), as noted in [7], are therefore also classified
in the G set and consequently becomes part of the VBL.
c) Case 3: Low Prevalence and Low Persistence: Low
persistence generally indicates anomalous updates. Malicious
ASes that are trying to hijack a prefix typically announce
short AS-prefix binding instances in order to avoid detection
and engage in nefarious activities such as mounting targeted
denial of service attacks [21]. Therefore, we categorize all
such hijacked AS-prefix bindings, with low prevalence and low
persistence in the U set.
d) Case 4: High Prevalence and Low Persistence: The
only remaining case is the one where AS-prefix bindings have
high prevalence and low persistence. To classify them into
the appropriate GBU sets it is essential to understand the
implications of this behavior. When the prevalence is high for
an AS-prefix binding it means that the overall time within
the observation window for which the AS claimed to have a
direct path to the prefix was above an acceptable threshold.
However, by the same token, a low average persistence value
indicates that each time the AS-prefix binding was announced
it was withdrawn after a short time duration. Therefore, for
an AS-prefix binding to have prevalence higher than T P r
but persistence lower than T P s indicates that such AS-prefix
bindings have a large number of instances. This indicates a
vacillating ownership of prefixes, where the claim for ownership occurs many times during the observation window but
does not last as long as the persistence threshold. We classify
such AS-prefix bindings in the B set. We do so because the
prefix involved, upon further analysis (see Section VIII-A1),
is found to be owned by the announcing AS. Consequently,
this behavior does not go against the intent of BGP in terms
of exchanging correct reachability information between ASes.
However, such AS-prefix bindings usually last for a very small
time duration that makes them impractical to use for routing
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data. Table II shows some of the prominent cases of vacillating
AS-prefix bindings that were observed.
Note that, vacillating prefixes are independent to the illegal
or hijacked nature of prefixes. It is therefore theoretically possible for hijacked prefixes to be vacillating as well. However,
we believe that ASes that want to hijack prefixes might rarely
want them to vacillate as it will make it difficult for them to
attract traffic through a unstable route. Further analysis based
on real-world traces also confirms this phenomena (see Section
VIII-A1).
C. Feedback Refinement
Given this basic classification of AS-prefix bindings, we
now apply a set of refinements to reclassify common mistakes
made by ASes while announcing prefixes. Inspired by [12],
[7] we use two criteria in this regard:
0
• De-aggregation: An AS y whose binding with prefix p
has been classified in the U set, is reclassified to the
G set, if there is an AS-prefix binding {y, p} in the G
set, such that p0 ⊂ p. We do this because the AS in
question already has a stable binding with a super-prefix
(p). Therefore, there is a high possibility that it owns p0
as well. Its announcement does not prevent the expected
operation of BGP and merits the re-classification to G
set.
• Stable Owner in the Path: Suppose {n, p, t} is in the
G set and an update of the form {p, AS P AT H =
ha, b, . . . , n, . . . , xi} is received at the time t0 , where x is
the announcer. Now if the entry {x, p, t0 } was originally
put in U set, we remove it and ignore the value, the reason
being: (1) the short duration of the binding {x, p}, and
(2) the presence of the stable owner n in the AS PATH
that can still receive the data traffic directed toward p.
V. R EPUTATION - BASED A LERTS
AS-CRED provides a real-time reputation-based alert service, through the Alert Manager, which flags updates trying
to advertise potentially invalid AS-prefix bindings. The alerts
along with the reputation values can be used by ASes to make
various forms of decisions, from whether to accept updates
originating from specific ASes to peering with specific ASes.
We employ a support vector machine (SVM) to serve as the
alert generation engine of the AS-CRED Alert Manager. We
choose SVM because of it is well-understood and has excellent
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tool support. Our current implementation uses the libsvm
library and chooses the radial basis function kernel [22]. The
SVM is trained every fifteen minutes (can be changed if
needed) based on two types of AS-prefix bindings: Type 1:
a set of 5000 AS-prefix bindings sampled from all bindings
announced during the last ten days of the observation window,
and Type 2: the AS-prefix bindings received from the last
fifteen minutes that are not contained in the VBL. We chose
these sources as they provide a reasonably long historical
view of the quotidian BGP operation and capture the behavior
pattern of sporadic network events, such as network outage.
This makes the alert service adaptive. For every AS-prefix
binding in the training set, we use the reputation value of
the AS as the feature and its GBU feedback as the label.
Type 2 AS-bindings are labeled in the following manner: (1)
since such bindings are not contained in VBL, we give them
label U by default; and (2) some of the bindings are then relabeled by applying the refinements described in Section IV-C.
Once the training is complete, the SVM model is used in the
alert generation process. The SVM re-training and the alert
generation overhead are minimal — a commodity machine
can easily handle the process for real-time BGP updates.
Figure 3 illustrates the alert generation process. In ASCRED, the alerts are generated based on a combination of
the VBL filtering and reputation-based labeling. The alert
service is tiered in the types of alerts generated. This is
specifically designed to tackle the complex dynamics of BGP
operation. We believe that existing alert systems that produce
binary alerts of goodness or badness of updates are inherently
incapable of capturing this complexity [12]. Overall, the alert
generation process works as follows:
•

•

•

VBL Filtering: When a new update is received, the Alert
Manager first check to see if its corresponding AS-prefix
binding {a, p} is in the VBL. If so, it is considered to be
valid and no alerts are generated. Otherwise, the binding
is called non-VBL binding.
Invalidity Labeling: For a non-VBL binding, the Alert
Manager then fetches RepB (a) and RepU (a) for the
announcing AS a as the feature and feeds it into the
trained SVM model. The model then predicts the alert
label “Vacillating” or “Hijacked” for the bindings within
the update. (The bindings which are labeled “Vacillating”
are added to a set called V T and the ones labeled
“Hijacked” are added to the HJ for accuracy analysis.
The results of the analysis are discussed in Section
VIII-B).
Potential Invalidity Labeling: Within an alert generation window, if an reputable AS announces more than
TT rustLimit number of non-VBL bindings without triggering “Vacillating” or “Hijacked” alerts, the Alert Manager generates “Potentially Invalid” alerts for all the
updates that contain such non-VBL bindings (including
the ones previously deemed valid).

The Potential Invalidity Labeling is designed to tackle the
dynamic nature of AS behavior, where highly reputable ASes
may start exhibiting poor behaviors. In AS-CRED, the risk
associated with blindly trusting reputable ASes is controlled
by introducing a trust upper bound: TT rustLimit . TT rustLimit
essentially specifies the maximum number of false negatives
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that can be tolerated within an alert generation window (i.e.,
24 hours). Therefore, the value of TT rustLimit can be conservatively set to zero to eliminate such risk. However, this will
prevent benign ASes from announcing valid new AS-prefix
bindings. The value needs to be set low enough to allow ASes
to announce new prefix bindings while minimizing the false
negatives. Further discussions selecting the threshold value are
presented in Section VI-4.
VI. AS-CRED PARAMETER S ELECTION
As AS-CRED deals with the complex inter-domain routing
infrastructure whose dynamics change over time. We have
therefore designed it to be tunable. One can adaptively select
new values for its various parameters as the AS behavior
evolves. In this section, we share our experiences in choosing
appropriate values for a list of parameters used in AS-CRED,
namely: the half-life values in the reputation function, the
length of observation window, the choice of default reputation
values, the stability threshold, and the TT rustLimit threshold
for alert generation. Note that, in this discussion, we provide
one possible approach for selecting these parameters, which
has yielded satisfying results as seen in Section VIII. Other,
more involved, approaches can easily be utilized for tuning
AS-CRED as required.
1) Half-life Values & Observation Window Length: Based
on the historical anomaly detection we found that over 75%
of the ASes within the B and the U sets reappear within 3
and 6 days, respectively. This demonstrates that AS behavior
is repetitive. This observation allows us to set the half-life
values, used in Section III-B2, to be hU = 6 days for RepU
and hB = 3 days for the RepB . The half-life values enable
us to worsen the reputation of the ASes that repeat their poor
behavior frequently. Conversely, ASes that seldom repeat their
poor behavior will not be penalized as much.
The length of the observation window is determined by
the time-decay property of the reputation function and the
repetitiveness of the AS behavior pattern. Given these half-life
values, after 60 days an instance of invalid AS-prefix binding
will contribute only 2−10 (for RepB ) and 2−20 (for RepU ) to
the reputation. Therefore, our 60 day observation window is
adequate for this work.
2) Default Reputation Value: In typical reputation systems,
one would prefer to assign newcomers with a rather low
reputation value. This design choice is often made to mitigate
the possibility of Sybil attacks (i.e., malicious entities creating
multiple new identities). However for BGP, the threshold to
entry is sufficiently high to prevent this situation. Moreover,
the creation of new ASes are relatively rare events, and
sufficient historical information is often available for the AS
reputation computation. As a result, we currently choose to
use [0,0] (i.e., the best reputation) as the initial reputation for
ASes. However, this design choice can be changed if the above
observations change.
3) Stability Threshold: To select the thresholds for the
stability analysis of AS-prefix bindings, we compute the prevalence and persistence for each AS-prefix binding observed
within the observation window. We then assign the T P r
(i.e., threshold for prevalence) and T P s (i.e., threshold for
persistence) to specific values and classify the bindings into the
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GBU sets. For the T P r and T P s pair, we compare the entries
in the GBU sets with Internet Routing Registries (IRR), and
compute the false positives (FPs). We repeated the previous
two steps, by varying the T P r and T P s pair, until we find
the values that minimize FPs. We choose IRR because: (1) an
average of 87% of the IP prefixes announced through updates
were found in the IRR, which makes IRR largely complete;
(2) more than 70% of AS-prefix bindings on average had
a matching record in IRR, and (3) there is a lack of other
authoritative source of the same nature.
Figure 4 shows our analysis using IRR for different T P r
and T P s for updates received between Nov. 1, 2009 to
Dec. 30, 2009. Notice that we do not have to consider false
negatives (FNs) in identifying the threshold values as it falls
entirely under the FP surface. We find that the lowest FP value
is obtained at T P r = 1% and T P s = 4 hours. However, for
this work, we chose the values T P r = 1% and T P s = 10
hours as the thresholds. The decision is based on three factors:
(1) the value of 10 hours allows us to capture 95% of the poor
behaviors as suggested in [7], (2) the difference between the
FPs at the two points was less than one percent (17.7% to
18.4%), and (3) a T P s of 10 hours prevents an AS from
sustaining an unowned prefix announcement long enough to
avoid detection. Note that, this FP value should not be seen
as a true representation of the Historical Anomaly Detector’s
capabilities. This is because IRR, which forms the basis of
this value, is an imperfect ground truth.
4) Potential Invalidity Threshold: Threshold TT rustLimit
is used for triggering “Potential Invalid” alerts (see Section
V). Our strategy for selecting this threshold value is to find
a value: (1) that is low enough to bound the potential risk
associated with accepting anomalous updates from reputable
ASes; and (2) that prevents a considerable portion of new
and valid bindings announced by reputable ASes from raising
alarms. Please note that alternative strategies are also possible
depending upon the risk objectives. To this end, we studied
the AS-prefix bindings announced by reputable ASes, which
were not in the VBL. Within an alert generation window (i.e.,
24 hour period), around 400 ASes were found to be involved
in such behavior and each AS announces four such bindings,
on average. Moreover, about 50% of these ASes announce one
or less of such bindings per day, 70% announce two or less,
90% announce ten or less. According to this observation, we
choose the TT rustLimit value to be 2 bindings/24 hours in the
current operation of AS-CRED.
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VII. S ECURITY A NALYSIS OF AS-CRED
AS-CRED provides reputation values that can be used by
ASes to be cognizant of the behavior of others. Consequently,
it exposes itself to attacks that try to: (1) promote ASes, or
(2) defame ASes. In this section, we analyze AS-CRED’s
resilience to such attacks.
Self Promotion: An AS may want to improve its current
reputation in order to minimize the chances of triggering an
alert while announcing invalid bindings.
Self-promotion is not possible in AS-CRED. The underlying
assumption of AS-CRED is that no amount of good deeds
can redeem poor behavior. As a result, the reputation function
is designed to only consider poor behavior. The only way
reputation can be improved is to wait and let the time-decay
function heal the reputation (see Section III-B2). Furthermore,
a “healed” reputation value will not give an AS any substantial
benefit since: (1) reputable ASes are given only limited trust
(see Section V); and (2) AS-CRED provides not just current
AS reputation values but also the past reputation trends. Users
of AS-CRED can take this information into account and make
an informed decision about the trustworthiness of an AS,
irrespective of its current reputation value.
Slandering: In contrast to the self promotion attack, an attacker AS may attempt to slander other innocent ASes, by
announcing low persistence AS-prefix bindings in their name,
and try to damage their reputation.
This is equivalent to performing “identity theft” in our
setting. Such attacks can usually be mitigated by cryptographic approaches such as S-BGP [8]. However, given their
complexity, such adoption has been rather slow. Interestingly,
this is a problem faced by all schemes that deal with BGP
update semantics such as PGBGP [12] and PHAS [13]. In the
future, we plan to enhance AS-CRED with other data-plane
probing techniques such as [14], which can potentially build
fingerprints of ASes. Such techniques can aid enormously in
automated, real-time slander mitigation.
VIII. P ERFORMANCE R ESULTS
In this section, we present the performance results of the
AS-CRED service in terms of both its historical anomaly
detection capabilities, and the effectiveness of its alert system.
The results have been obtained by setting the AS-CRED
parameters to the values described in Section VI.
A. Historical Anomaly Detection Analysis
Here, we demonstrate: (1) AS-CRED’s historical anomaly
detection is accurate, (2) ASes repeat their poor behavior,
and (3) the reputation values of ASes are representative of
their anomalous behavior. Together, they illustrate that AS
reputation is both past-representative and future-predictive,
which forms an ideal metric for triggering alerts for any
subsequent anomalous updates.
1) Accuracy of Anomaly Detection: The reputation of an
AS depends upon the GBU feedback provided by the historical anomaly detection mechanism used to identify invalid ASprefix bindings of the past. It is therefore necessary to ensure
that AS-prefix bindings in the GBU sets are there for the
correct reason. We demonstrate this based on the satisfaction
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of the following two tests: (1) an evaluation of the validity of
the AS-prefix bindings in the G and the B sets compared to
the U set, and (2) an evaluation of the stability of the ASprefix bindings in the B set compared to the G set. Together
the two tests demonstrate that the historical anomaly detection
quality of AS-CRED is satisfactory.
a) Validity: The semantics of the bindings in the U set
is that the AS does not own the prefix. On the other hand,
bindings in the G and the B sets, contain prefixes owned by the
corresponding AS. To validate this, we use the IRR to check
whether the AS-prefix binding in the GBU sets match the
documented prefix ownership information. Figure 5(a) shows
the percentage of AS-prefix bindings in the G set, vacillating
bindings in the B set and hijacked ones in the U set that have
a match in IRR. It can be seen that AS-prefix bindings in
the G and the B sets can overwhelmingly be found in IRR,
compared to those in the U set. This shows that AS-prefix
bindings that are classified as hijacked are usually accurate.
In Figure 5(a), the percentage of IRR matches for B is higher
G. This is because |B| << |G|, which makes the difference
in the match percentages less statistically significant.
b) Stability: The semantics of an AS-prefix binding in
the B set is that they are vacillating4 . Figure 5(b) charts the
average number of instances of binding establishment and
withdrawal seen for entries in the G set and the vacillating
entries in the B set on a selected set of dates. Overall, the
vacillating AS-prefix bindings were established and terminated
on average 30 times more often (with a maximum of 4492)
than AS-prefix bindings classified in the G set, where the
average number was close to one. The results demonstrate
that vacillating AS-prefix bindings are distinct from those in
the G set, given that their quantity is an order of magnitude
larger.
2) Anomalous Behavior Trends and Repetitiveness: In this
subsection, we summarize the results of the historical anomaly
detection and show that ASes repeat their behaviors. Figure
6(a) shows the summary of the historical anomaly detection
over the six months of AS-CRED’s operation. We find that on
4 We exclude updates announced by BGP Beacons (used for studying
BGP dynamics (http://www.psg.com/?zmao/BGPBeacon.html)), as they often
display similar characteristics.

average over 35K unique ASes were observed, out of which
only 5% (about 1740) of the ASes were found to display poor
behaviors. Only about 0.2% (about 70) of the ASes displayed
exclusively poor behaviors for all prefixes they announce.
Overall, 421K AS-prefix bindings were observed, out of which
about 10.9% were classified as displaying poor behaviors.
An interesting piece of information that can be discerned
from the historical anomaly detection summary is the extent
to which poor behaviors afflict the inter-domain routing world.
Figure 6(b) shows, with the benefit of hindsight, how many
of the AS-prefix bindings seen every day from Jan. 1, 2010
to Jun. 30, 2010 eventually turned out to be hijacked or vacillating. It can be seen that AS-prefix bindings that eventually
turn out to be vacillating are an order of magnitude greater in
number than hijacked AS-prefix bindings or those with illegal
AS numbers. However, there are some clear spikes in the case
of the latter. For example, the spike on April 8th, 2010 is
the due to AS23734’s Internet-scale hijacking attempt [23].
Overall, announcement of poor AS-prefix bindings seems to
be consistently present and their magnitude, barring occasional
jitters, is largely even.
3) AS Reputation Trends: With the data analyzed and
feedback obtained in the form of the GBU sets, we can now
compute the reputation of the ASes. Figure 7 shows the count
of ASes that exhibited poor behaviors over the six months of
AS-CRED operation. It can be seen that number of such ASes
remains more or less the same over the entire period. Further,
around 90% of such ASes have a reputation value between
zero and one. This is significant because it demonstrates three
things: (1) the reputation value properly characterizes the ASes
in terms of the historical anomalies they exhibit, (2) even
among the ASes that have exhibit anomalies, an overwhelming
majority do so rarely5 , and (3) AS-CRED is sensitive enough
to capture even those ASes that rarely exhibit anomalies.
4) Reputation and Alternate Data Sources: Due to the
distributed nature of the Internet, it is very difficult to obtain a
complete knowledge of it. The RouteViews data provides only
a partial view of the information exchanged at the inter-domain
level of the Internet. We therefore investigate the consistency
5 Repeat

offenders sometimes have reputation in the thousands.
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of AS reputation computed using BGP updates collected from
different locations. To this end, we compared the AS reputation
computed based on RouteViews with another trace collector
maintained by Reseaux IP Europeens (RIPE) called RIS [24].
We observed that almost all ASes have identical reputation
values, except only about 0.09% of the ASes have an absolute
difference of RepU ≥ 1. For RepB the percentage is 0.50%.
Such differences are mainly due to the fact that certain ASprefix bindings are observed at one data source but not the
others. In the future, we plan to further improve the quantity
and location diversity of the data sources used by AS-CRED
to improve its coverage.
B. AS-CRED Alert Analysis
In order to evaluate the correctness of alert generation
process, each time the alert type is re-labeled to “Hijacked” or
“Vacillating”, the associated AS and prefix are added to either
HJ or V T sets, respectively. Figure 8 shows the percentage
of updates triggering alerts during the six months of alert
generation. As seen during historical anomaly detection, we
find that the number of alerts generated for updates with
vacillating bindings in V T set are an order of magnitude
greater than those in the HJ set or updates having illegal AS
numbers. In the rest of the section, we analyze the correctness
and errors of the alerts generated.
1) Alert Accuracy Analysis: To evaluate the correctness of
the “Hijacked” alerts generated by AS-CRED, we compare it

with an alternative alert system called the Internet Alert Registry (IAR). IAR is a well-known historical information-based
prefix hijack alert system. It is based on Pretty Good BGP
(PGBGP) [12]. IAR identifies suspicious AS-prefix bindings
by consulting a trusted list, learned from the recent history of
BGP updates. Initially, the trusted list is empty. All bindings
received during the next 10 days are added to the trusted
list. After this initial phase, any new bindings not present in
the trusted list are quarantined for 24 hours. If the bindings
have not been withdrawn at this time, they are added to the
trusted list. IAR triggers alert for all newly observed AS-prefix
bindings not in the trusted list [12]. We use IAR for our
comparison study because: (1) it is one of the few systems
that provides the latest prefix hijacking alerts, and (2) it has
been operational during the time-frame when we collected our
data.
For the purposes of this study, we use the IRR to provide a
common basis for comparison. The metric for comparing the
AS-CRED and IAR is error — the percentage of AS-prefix
bindings with a matching record in IRR. We do not perform
a more elaborate false positive, false negative based analysis
because: (1) the IAR database only provides information about
the AS-prefix bindings it considers hijacks, and (2) the BGP
updates seen by the IAR system might be different from ASCRED. For AS-CRED we find that the average error rate
(12.8%) is about fives times smaller than IAR (66.3%). This
result shows that the percentage of false alerts generated by
AS-CRED are much lower than IAR. The false negative rates
of the two systems are hard to compare because of the lack of
availability of associated IAR data. However, we reiterate that
risk of potential false negatives can be controlled in AS-CRED
by choosing appropriate TT rustLimit threshold. We plan to
conduct more extensive studies in this regard, as the necessary
dataset becomes available.
Evaluating the correctness of the updates classified as ”Vacillating” in the V T set was slightly different. As we do not
have a ground truth available to check for the correctness
of the classification, we depend upon behavior analysis that
considers “future” BGP updates. In this regard, we make use
of a consistency verification window. The idea is to allow
sufficient time for the alert-triggering AS-prefix bindings to
evolve in order to be analyzable with the benefit of hindsight.
The consistency verification window is 60 days long and
centered around each alert generation window. For example,
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TABLE V
AS-CRED A LERT E RROR C LASSIFICATION S UMMARY ( WITH BENEFIT OF
HINDSIGHT )

Count (log)

AS-CRED Alert Statistics
1e+09
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1e+07
1e+06
01/01
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05/01
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Total Number of AS-prefix bindings Seen Daily
Count (log)

1e+06
100000
10000
1000
100
01/01

02/01

03/01

Alerts in VT set

Fig. 8.
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Classification
HJ set entries classified as Good
HJ set entries classified as Vacillating
HJ set entries classified as Hijacked
VT set entries classified as Good
VT set entries classified as Vacillating
VT set entries classified as Hijacked

Percentage
8.9%
3.7%
87.4%
3.9%
94.7%
1.4%

06/01

Alerts in HJ set

Alert Generation Statistics

the consistency verification window for alerts generated on
Jan. 1, 2010 will span from Dec. 2, 2009 to Jan. 30, 2010 (see
Figure 2). The bottom graph of Figure 8(b) shows the error
results for entries in the V T set. We find that our prediction of
an AS-prefix binding to be vacillating is correct around 95%
of the time.
2) Alert Error Analysis: The alerts generated by AS-CRED
can not be absolutely accurate as we saw in the previous
section. Therefore, for each AS-prefix binding in the V T and
HJ set we determine its true designation with hindsight, and
investigate the reasons for the discrepancy, if any. In this
regard, we analyze the behavior of the AS-prefix bindings
in the V T and the HJ sets over the consistency verification
window (see Table V). We find 94.7% of AS-prefix bindings
in the V T set eventually turned out to be classified correctly.
Out of the remaining AS-prefix bindings, which erroneously
triggered an alert for being vacillating, 3.9% turned out to
be eventually in the G set with only 1.4% percent being
in the U set (i.e., hijacked). Such a small discrepancy is
because of mixed behaviors of ASes. That is, ASes that
consistently announce vacillating prefixes, do announce valid
or hijacked bindings, once in a while. However, given the very
small percentage of the misclassification, we believe that AS
behavior remains largely repetitive, allowing reputation to be
a good metric for triggering alerts. Similarly, 87.4% AS-prefix
bindings in the HJ set eventually turned out to be classified
correctly. Of the remaining incorrectly classified AS-prefix
bindings, 3.7% turned to be in the B set (i.e., vacillating), with
8.9% turning out to be eventually in the G set. This again
demonstrates the largely stable nature of AS behavior, with
occasional discrepancies. The AS-prefix bindings that trigger
alerts for being hijacked are more error prone because we err
on the side of caution and tune the SVM to generate higher
number of alerts, sacrificing some correctness in the process.
We take such a punitive stance because hijacked AS-prefix
bindings, if not detected, have the potential to be disruptive.
IX. R ELATED W ORK
Recent years have seen considerable number of works in
anomaly detection and prevention for the inter-domain routing
system. In this section we describe the prominent research in
this area.
Anomaly Prevention Mechanisms. S-BGP [8] is one of the
earliest and the most concrete security mechanism to address
BGP vulnerabilities. It constructs PKIs rooted at RIRs for

authenticating IP prefix ownership. AS PATH information is
also protected using nested digital signatures as the BGP updates propagate through the network. However, the deployment
difficulties and computational overhead of these schemes have
made their adoption cumbersome in the inter-domain world.
To overcome some of these issues, a more incrementally
deployable scheme called So-BGP [25] has been proposed.
So-BGP adoptes a more flexible trust model to achieve AS
public key authentication. However, it has limited capability
to ensure the correctness of AS PATH. Further trade-offs have
been proposed in psBGP [26], which a low cost scheme to
verify the validity of the prefix origins with neighbor ASes
using a prefix assertion list. A prefix ownership assertion made
by an AS is valid if it is consistent with assertions made
by one of its peers. However, colluding ASes can still forge
origin information under this scheme. In [27], the authors
formalize the semantics of address delegation and design
strategies for reducing resource costs associated with existing
origin authentication schemes.
Anomaly Detection. Detecting attacks on the BGP routing
infrastructure has received its own share of attention. Many
of these schemes use data-plane probing where an AS, on
suspecting an update to be an attempted hijack, probes the
announcer to verify its suspicion [14], [16], [28]. Although
they achieve reasonably high detection accuracy, some of these
approaches can only be leveraged by the victim originator
AS during the attack phase. Therefore, such approach will
have limited global impacts without a full network deployment. Another approach is to analyze historical control-plane
information for detecting any subsequent problematic updates
[13]. The recent proposal of Pretty Good BGP (PGBGP) [12]
uses this approach to delay the selection of suspicious routes.
However, as demonstrated in our evaluation with real world
traces, it suffers from high error rates. Moreover, the focus
of all these approaches is limited to detecting instances of
prefix hijacking. None of these approaches study vacillating
bindings as AS-CRED does nor provide a quantitative way to
analyze and understand AS behavior itself. Instead of focusing
on proposing concrete detection mechanism, [29] focuses on
accurately locating the attacker for a prefix hijacking incident
through the active monitoring of routes changes. This work
compliments existing detection mechanisms by pin-pointing
the root-cause of anomalous route changes. In [30], the authors
study the strategies of utilizing existing protection and detection mechanisms to achieve effective and feasible solutions
for dealing with prefix hijacking in the real-world. However,
the solutions used require the presence of detection agents in
impacted ASes which is an assumption AS-CRED does not
make.

POST-PRINT VERSION OF THE MANUSCRIPT PUBLISHED IN IEEE SYSTEMS JOURNAL

Reputation Schemes. In [31], the authors use the notion of
reputation for accepting or rejecting updates based on a trusted
overlay network over the existing AS topology. Once such an
overlay is set up, if a node wants to determine the accuracy
of an update with respect to prefix hijacking and AS path
spoofing, then it can simply query its neighbors in the overlay
network. Similarly, in [32], the authors present a reputation
system for ASes with a focus on preventing propagation of
bogus routing information. However, their mechanism also depends on computing reputation based on an alliance of ASes.
As AS-CRED does not depend on inputs from other ASes
to compute reputation, it avoids complications or inaccuracies
relating to possibly biased feedback. In [1], the authors present
an AS reputation scheme that has probabilistic interpretation.
Unlike [1], the reputation value computed by AS-CRED is
independent of the good behavior an AS exhibits. In other
words, [1] presents a complementary view to the reputation
scheme used in AS-CRED.
X. C ONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented AS-CRED, an AS reputation
and alert service that not only detects anomalous BGP
updates but also provides a quantitative view of AS behavior.
AS-CRED works by computing AS reputation based on
feedback provided by analyzing the historical BGP data
for the presence of anomalies (i.e., hijacked or vacillating).
Based on this analysis, AS-CRED also creates a “white-list”
of valid AS-prefix bindings. The reputation and “white-list”
are combined to design a novel tiered alert system for
tracking subsequent anomalous updates. We publish the AS
reputation information on a publicly available portal website
(http://rtg.cis.upenn.edu/qtm/ascred/). The
analysis of AS-CRED over a six month period indicates its
effectiveness and improvement of over similar alert systems,
a fact also demonstrated by its ability to successfully detect
large scale hijack events [23]. In the future, we would like to
construct more descriptive AS behaviors, and use the resulting
AS reputation information to predict the likely amount of
invalid BGP behaviors that are going to be exhibited at any
given time in the future.
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